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THE TERMINATION OF JOINT VENTURES:




The need for organizations to engage in strategic alliances
such as joint ventures has become axiomatic. But as befits the re-
cent increase in their use, the research into these alliances re-
mains at an embryonic stage. Most studies focus on questions of
why and how firms should use joint ventures. With few excep-
tions, there has been limited study of the phenomenon of joint
venture termination.'
By their nature, though, joint ventures are temporary ar-
rangements.2 A frequently cited Business Week article demon-
strates the fragile nature of these ventures. The failure rate may
be as high as seventy percent. Often, the fact that joint ventures
terminate is presumed to be evidence that they have failed,
prompting a search for the differences between "successful" (that
is, ongoing ventures) and "unsuccessful" (that is, terminated ven-
tures). However, these terminations may or may not represent
failure, as joint ventures are not intended to be permanent struc-
tures. Harrigan concluded, for example, that joint ventures were
used as transitional arrangements by parent firms. 3 Gomes-
t Professor, University of Illinois.
t Professor, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
1. See, e.g., J. Hagedoom & J. Schakenraad, The Effect of Strategic Technology
Alliances on Company Performance, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 291 (1994); E. Keise, Big
Brother Alliances: The Tie that Sometimes Binds, 147 CHEM. WK. 38 (1991).
2. See Jonathan B. Levine & John A. Byrne, Corporate Odd Couples, Bus. WK.,
JULY 21,1986, at 100.
3. See KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VENTURE SUCCESS (1986).
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Casseres noted the value of these temporal arrangements:
Joint ventures allow firms to tap into the resources
of other firms, and, in the process, to increase their
own capabilities. As the firm's capabilities grow, it
may no longer need the cooperation of its joint
venture partner... But rather than seeing this as
evidence that joint ventures are prone to failure,
one might well consider this self-liquidating fea-
ture of joint ventures a somewhat paradoxical sign
of success. 4
We adapt a guarded perspective in this study, and treat
termination as a performance-neutral event. Our interest is in
demonstrating how specific governance variables affect the ter-
mination rates of joint ventures. Our work is based on the belief
that effective joint venturing requires planning for both the be-
ginning and the end of the ventures. While the need for "up-
front" planning (selection of partner, division of responsibilities,
preparation of the contract) in joint ventures may be obvious, the
need to think about potential termination of the venture is less
obvious. Like marriages, few joint ventures start with the expec-
tation of divorce. This is particularly short sighted in that joint
ventures probably should be temporal arrangements.
The work presented here is based on joint venture experi-
ence in three industries: computers, pharmaceuticals and auto-
mobiles. Joint ventures have been a common practice in these
industries for the nearly two decades. These industries have been
at the forefront of major global change, and have witnessed sub-
stantial shifts in the patterns of production and competition.
Competitors in these industries are riding the same waves of
change, and may have more experience with founding and ter-
minating joint ventures, than currently seen in financial services.
The analysis we present in this study is based on the field
4. See Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, Joint Venture Instability: Is it a problem?,
22 COLTJM. J. oF WORLD Bus. 97,101 (1987).
288 [Vol. 4
TERMINATION OF JOINT VENTURES
of transaction cost economics. There have been several applica-
tions of transactions cost-based prescriptions to the form of gov-
ernance structure or the emergent properties of the joint venture.5
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of these
prescriptions to issues of termination. Like managers, researchers
appear to be more interested in beginnings than endings. We re-
dress some of the imbalance in this study. Our research question
is: "what variables derived from transaction cost economics in-
fluence termination rates?"
We present the paper in five parts. First, we describe the
unique issues relevant to joint ventures. Then, we briefly review
transactions cost economics, a theory base that has been used to
explain joint ventures. In the third section, we use transaction
cost economics to build hypotheses about joint venture termina-
tions. The two final sections present and discuss the results.
II. JOINT VENTURES
As noted above, the domestic incidence of joint ventures
has increased dramatically. In some sectors of the economy, more
domestic joint ventures were announced in a single year in the
1980's than had been announced in the entire history of the in-
dustry. Across industries, a ten-fold increase occurred in the
number of joint ventures established between 1980 and 1989.
More joint ventures appeared in the decade of the 80's than all
previous decades combined.
6
Why the increase? Evidently, joint ventures fill a strategic
need for organizations. Joint ventures help organizations extend
5. See Oliver E. Williamson, the Economics of Organization: The Transaction
Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. Soc. 548 (1981) (applying transaction cost economics in
the analysis of joint ventures). Williamson is the most frequently cited writer on the
topic of transaction cost economics. See also Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarihj Breed
Trust: The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 85 (1995); Arvind Parkhe, Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic
and Transaction Cost Examination of Inter-firm Cooperation, 36 ACAD. MGMT J. 794
(1993) (applying transaction cost economics in the analysis of joint ventures).
6. See ROBERT LYNCH, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO JOINT VENTURES AND CORPO-
RATE ALLIANCES (1989).
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resources, acquire tacit resources, and engage in forms of organ-
izational learning. Joint ventures result from a firm's inability to
develop products or services internally or to merge with provid-
ers of products or services. Mergers are difficult and expensive.
Joint ventures allow for sustained rents (profits) where the com-
petitive advantage builds on a combination of resources not con-
tained in the firm and not easily exchanged in the marketplace.
Profits, though, offer targets for opportunism, where self-
interested partners gain at the expense of non-vigilant partners.
The design of a joint venture, then, requires careful attention to
conditions that might encourage opportunism. Given the found-
ing conditions surrounding the joint venture, participants can see
the "shadow of the future" - that is, participants anticipate forces
for opportunism, and build governance features that restrict the
naturally arising opportunistic impulses. In commenting on the
structure of cooperative ventures, Parkhe notes that it would be
exciting if "later problems can be mitigated by doing things dif-
ferently at the 'front end' - that ex ante attention to structure can
improve cooperative performance." 7 Similarly, forethought about
the potential for opportunism might lead to more effective termi-
nations of joint ventures.
III. JoINT VENTURES AND TRANSACION CosT EcoNoMIcs
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is an analytical frame-
work that focuses on the costs and difficulties associated with
cross-party exchanges. TCE recognizes various impediments to
purely efficient exchanges between organizations. Four of these
are of special interest for understanding the issues related to joint
ventures termination.
First, information asymmetry refers to situations in which
parties negotiating a transaction may not have the same informa-
tion. Problems with information asymmetry may occur in a joint
venture, for example, when a firm is unable to accurately assess
the value of contributions offered by a potential partner.
7. See Parkhe, supra note 5, at 795.
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Second, bounded rationality refers ,to the cognitive limita-
tions of economic actors and assumes that their decisions are in-
tended to be rational but are actually only limitedly so. The
underlying idea is that even when a party has access to all rele-
vant information, there are bounds to an individual's ability to
understand the information. This assumption implies that for
complex transactions, most parties will be limited in their ability
to write contracts that cover all possible contingencies. In most
instances, joint ventures will be complex transactions.
Third, opportunism refers to "self-interest seeking with
guile." The presence of opportunism, and its potential, leads to
decreased returns and increased risk. Problems arise not because
everyone acts opportunistically, but because they may. As a re-
sult, parties must factor the possibility of such behavior into an
exchange, and choose mechanisms to protect against the inci-
dence of opportunism. Joint ventures can be an arena for oppor-
tunism, and some firms have used joint ventures as an avenue for
entering a partner's business after absorbing the partner's tacit
knowledge.
Finally, idiosyncratic gains without guile are possible. One
party in the transaction can gain unexpected valuable informa-
tion that creates economic opportunity beyond the life or struc-
tural boundaries of the joint venture. This information or
knowledge is a free good for the firm that acquires it. Failure to
account for the free good can lead to tensions between the parties
in the joint venture.
All joint ventures face some of these impediments to effi-
cient exchange. The relevance of these impediments may be in-
creasing, as the proportion of joint ventures formed for the
purpose of knowledge management has increased in recent
years. The exchange of knowledge is difficult because it presents
parties with three types of problems not found in most other ex-
changes. First, knowledge is intangible. As such, it is impossible
to adjudge the value of contributions across partners, and asym-
metric distributions of contributions are likely to emerge. Second,
knowledge may be embedded in organizational routines, and
may be unarticulated. This tacit property of knowledge makes it
difficult to anticipate either the pathways or the costs to exchang-
2000]
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ing the knowledge, thus reducing the utility of contracts. Finally,
knowledge once exchanged can not be returned, as something
that is learned by a party can not be unlearned. This last property
of knowledge increases the importance of managing the risk of
opportunism as any knowledge gained through opportunistic
behavior (or by accident) may result in permanent advantage to
the opportunistic party, at the expense of the offended party.8
In financial services, many of the most interesting joint
ventures involve the exchange of knowledge across firms. Given
the natural fit between the contracting conditions covered by
TCE and the conditions present in knowledge creating joint ven-
tures it is unsurprising that concepts and constructs developed in
TCE have found ready application to joint ventures.
IV. JOINT VENTURE TERMINATIONS: TCE BASED HYPOTHESES
Ventures will last longer when partners have similar cul-
tures, similar asset sizes, and experience with venturing. The
presence of similar cultures and experience with venturing might
decrease opportunism and bounded rationality. Partners with
similar cultures and experience don't evidence the problems ad-
dressed by TCE (asymmetry of knowledge, bounded rationality,
opportunism) and therefore, last longer, or terminate less fre-
quently, than ventures that do evidence these problems. Unfor-
tunately, the ventures which don't present these problems don't
add significant new knowledge to the partners.
How, then, can firms engage in ventures which do create
knowledge, without facing excessive risk of loss to the partner?
Ventures which adopt the appropriate governance procedures
suggested by TCE should last longer, or terminate less fre-
quently, than ventures which do not adopt the appropriate gov-
ernance procedures. In this section, we develop hypotheses to
predict joint venture termination, based on TCE. Transaction cost
8. See KENNm J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF risK-BEARING (1976)
(describing the economic characteristics of knowledge); JOSEPH L. BADARACCO, JR.,
THE KNOWLEDGE LINK: How FIRMS COMPETE THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES (1991)
(describing the economic characteristics of knowledge).
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analyses use a semi-standardized framework in which transac-
tions are differentiated on the basis of specific variables: asset
specificity, liquidation of damages clauses, transaction complex-
ity, behavioral transparency, and frequency of exchanges. Our
hypotheses are based on these variables drawn from the transac-
tion cost framework.
A. Asset Specificity
Asset specificity refers to the fungibility of assets dedi-
cated to a venture. If the assets have a broad range of uses, the
firm investing in the venture is at less risk of opportunistic be-
havior by a partner because the assets can be readily deployed
elsewhere in the firm. Where assets are specific to the joint ven-
ture, they will have limited value in alternate applications. The
presence of specific assets, then, increases the level of partner
vigilance before and after the venture agreement, and also in-
creases the potential cost of a termination. Due to the combina-
tion of increased care and cost, joint ventures with high levels of
specific assets should have lower termination rates.
As Williamson notes, asset specificity has "the greatest
significance for examining the governance of contractual rela-
tions."9 Despite their significance at the inception of the joint ven-
ture, specific assets devoted to joint ventures may vary in their
impact over time for several reasons. First, the assets devoted to
joint ventures generally represent a small total of an organiza-
tion's total assets. In this regard, what is specific in the economic
sense may not be material in the organizational sense. Second,
just as in the case of mergers, responsibility for initiating the
merger may be separated from responsibility for implementing
the merger. Individuals involved in implementing the merger
may face a different set of incentives for continuance or discon-
tinuance of the merger than implied by asset specificity. Simi-
larly, the individuals responsible for starting ventures may be
organizationally distinct from the individuals responsible for
9. See Williamson, supra note 5, at 548.
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managing the firm's risk profile. Venture starters may not be
fully aware of the hazards associated with specific assets. Third,
the dynamic nature of joint ventures suggests that costs and re-
turns might be subject to high discounts in assessing capital
flows, lessening the impact of the loss of the assets initially in-
vested.
The impact of asset specificity on the incidence of joint
venture termination has not been tested. Based on this success in
predicting other forms of structural variance, we predict:
HI: The level of recoverable assets in a joint venture will be
lower in a terminated venture than in ongoing one.
B. Liquidated Damages
The complex nature of the joint venture transaction leaves
each party at risk of opportunism by the other. One way to
minimize opportunism is to impose a cost of termination on each
party. Contract provisions known as liquidated damages are
thought to provide deterrents to opportunism. Where present,
these provisions alter a party's termination decision by forcing it
to factor these costs into its perceived benefits from the termina-
tion.
Liquidated damage procedures may not be a panacea for
termination, though, because the negotiation of these clauses is
difficult and expensive. Individuals and courts have difficulty
evaluating the value of intangible assets. As noted earlier, the in-
dividuals responsible for forming the joint venture may differ
from those responsible for making the implementation decisions.
Where they exist, however, comprehensive liquidation damage
provisions should provide some deterrent to the desire to termi-
nate a joint venture. This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: The level of comprehensive liquidated damage provisions
will be lower in a terminated venture than in an ongoing one.
C. Transaction Complexity
One form of complex transaction is the international
transaction. Organizations and managers must conform to a set
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of relevant norms of behavior, or face social consequences. These
societal norms originate within distinct historical, political and
social frameworks that are largely shaped by national contextual
factors which are thought to "embody different attitudes, values,
and beliefs that find their materialization in distinct business cul-
tures, styles and practices." 10 Managers in different countries,
then, exhibit different strategic behaviors and interpret behavior
differently. These differences add a level of complexity to joint
ventures. The complexity, in turn, increases termination rates:
H3: Differences in national norms of the parent organizations
will be higher in a terminated venture than in an ongoing one.
D. Behavioral Transparency
As with all new social relationships, each partner to a ven-
ture is uncertain about the actions and motives of its counter-
parts. There is some uncertainty, for example, about a partner's
willingness to unilaterally terminate an alliance.
One protection against uncertainty in a joint venture is the
level of behavioral transparency. A party's behavior is transpar-
ent if one partner is able to detect opportunistic behavior by the
other. In his examination of joint venture restructuring, Parkhe
found that the transparency of opportunistic behavior lowered
the presence of ex ante contractual safeguards." The issue ex-
plored here, however, centers on the relationship between behav-
ioral transparency and joint venture terminations:
H4: The level of behavioral transparency will be lower in a ter-
minated venture than in an ongoing one.
E. Transaction Frequency
If parties deal with each other in a variety of ways, their
transactions are frequent. Repeated contacts act to build trust.
10. See J. Michael Geringer & Louis Herbert, Measuring Performance of Interna-
tional Joint Ventures, 22 J. INT'L Bus. STuD. 249 (1991).
11. See Parkhe, supra note 5, at 819.
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Trust and opportunistic behavior should be inversely related. If
the perceived threat of opportunistic behavior increases the need
for ex ante safeguards and these safeguards add costs, then a
lowering of this threat should have the effect of lowering the
need for safeguards and their associated costs.
Multiple interactions provide information about how a
partner is likely to behave. Extra-transactional dealings may also
serve as cross-hostages. Hostages in this context generally refers
to transaction specific investments whose value decreases sub-
stantially outside the transaction but may be related to other
dealings between the parties. When multiple interactions exist,
any termination decision concerning one interaction may have an
effect on others. A party maybe less likely to seek termination of
a joint venture when the offended party can retaliate by with-
drawing from another relationship. Relationships become more
important than specific transactions, as predictors of the ven-
ture's status:
H5: Multiple corporate interactions will occur less frequently in
a terminated venture than in ongoing one.
This discussion of transaction frequency implies that there
is a level of trust between the partners in the venture. This trust
should influence the way the venture is managed. If both owners
are equally involved in the management of the venture, the cost
of management will be high based on the need for frequent
communication. Alternately, if management of the venture is
delegated to one partner or another, the speed of decision-
making can increase, and the cost of management decrease. Kill-
ing found that equal levels of ownership, that is, equal levels of
management involvement, led to a higher probability of failure.12
Where one partner takes responsibility for the venture, the likeli-
hood of failure should decrease:
H6: Joint ventures with equal ownership will terminate more
frequently than joint ventures with dominant ownership by a single
party.
12. See J. PETER KILLING, STRATEGIES FoRJoINTVENTURE SUCCESS 21 (1983).
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V. METHODS AND RESULTS
This study consisted of a survey mailed to joint venture
participants in three industries (computers, pharmaceuticals and
automobiles) that evidenced a high rate of joint ventures for the
late 80's and early 90's. We surveyed both terminated and on-
going ventures. We compared terminated and on-going ven-
tures, to assess any significant differences that might occur be-
tween them. Thus, we were interested in the variables predicting
termination. Standard survey methods were used, and the vari-
ables measured with instruments developed in other studies.
Table 1 summarizes the statistical analysis. The overall
model proved significant. The significant variables included the
amount of non-recoverable assets (based on a perceptual meas-
ure and a quantified measure), behavioral transparency assessed
on the basis of timing (how quickly could opportunism be no-
ticed), behavioral transparency based on the source (the partner),
and the level of shared management.
The measure of asset specificity adopted was the respon-
dent's assessment of non-recoverable assets, based on a percep-
tual measure and a quantified amount. The perceptual measure
and the quantified measure were not correlated with each other.
The perceptual measure assessed the level of non-recoverable as-
sets on a scale of "none" to "heavy," while the quantified meas-
ure assessed the amount as a percentage invested in the venture,
from 0 to 100%. Thus, it was possible for a small loss to be a 100%
loss, and for a large loss to be a fraction of the entire venture.
While the measures have opposite coefficients, the two measures
imply the same interpretation, since they were reverse scored.
We will discuss the results in terms of the perception of non-
recoverable assets, as the coefficients for this variable are gener-
ally larger.
The presence of specific, non-recoverable assets (a nega-
tive coefficient) implies a decrease in the probability of termina-
tion (terminated firms were scored "1"', ongoing ones, "0"),
indicating that the venture lasts longer. In the ongoing ventures
the respondents feel that they can not recover their assets, and
the venture continues. This is consistent with our hypothesis.
2000] 297
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Increases in behavioral transparency led to decreases in
termination rates. This is as hypothesized.
The governance structure measure, at the .10 level, did
differ between ongoing and terminated ventures. Consistent with
the logic of the hypothesis, the information requirements of
shared governance seem to make the transaction more costly, and
therefore, more subject to termination.
VI. DIscussION
The initial issue prompting the study was the need to di-
rectly assess the relationship between governance mechanisms
suggested by transaction cost economics and the termination of
joint ventures. It's fair to say that the set of variables derived
from a TCE perspective did an adequate job in differentiating
terminated from on-going ventures. Hypothesis one, four and six
were supported, and these were the hypotheses dealing most di-
rectly with the concepts used in TCE (asset specificity, behavioral
transparency, and ownership/management governance) agree-
ments. In retrospect, the two hypotheses with no support (the use
comprehensive damage clauses and international joint ventures)
may reflect issues that can be resolved ex ante. With respect to
contracting clauses, they apparently serve as sufficient support to
get the venture going, and then other factors drive termination.
With regard to international ventures, they are not sufficiently
different from domestic ventures as to have unique termination
impacts.
Two important points emerge from the pattern of results.
First, the presence of non-recoverable assets leads to a lower
probability of termination. Persistence is a favorable factor if per-
sistence is a signal of the venture's success. Alternately, though,
persistence is a trap if it is evidence that the partner firms have
not achieved their goals in the venture. As time passes, the per-
sistent report of non-recoverable assets may be an indication that
partners have not paid sufficient attention to how to internalize
the value from the joint venture.
Second, the presence of behavioral transparency lessens
the likelihood of termination. This finding, as the previous one, is
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exactly what transaction cost economics would predict. The prac-
tical importance of the finding, though, varies with how one val-
ues termination. If termination signals failure, and on-going
status success, then behavioral transparency is a positive charac-
teristic. If the reverse is true, then behavioral transparency may
be a misleading target for design purposes.
The value of transparency may vary with the purpose of
the joint venture. To the extent that the cooperative venture
represents a symmetric opportunity for the partners, transpar-
ency may be possible and valuable. To the extent that the coop-
erative venture provides asymmetric opportunity - where the
partners differ in their desired outcomes and contributions - be-
havioral transparency may be less attainable or desirable.
The main point here is that the conditions that appear at-
tractive from an ex ante perspective may not be as attractive from
an ex post perspective. The firms entering into the joint venture
should consider both perspectives. In a companion analysis,
looking at the impact of these variables on the time to termina-
tion, the results implied that firms quickly terminated ventures
where there were non-recoverable assets and high behavioral
transparency. It seems illogical to expect opportunistic behavior
in the presence of high behavioral transparency. Rather, it seems
that at this early stage, the level of commitment makes partners
nervous, and they terminate quickly. This pattern is consistent
with a view of partners that are quite not sure what they want to
or should do. Once again, the indication is that pre-venture un-
derstanding of purpose should lead to a better overall manage-
ment of the venture.
As noted earlier, the joint ventures created for the purpose
of sharing or creating knowledge may be the most important
type. These ventures generally foster the use of non-recoverable
assets, and might join partners who share little in common with
respect to culture or experience. Under these conditions, behav-
ioral transparency will be low. As we demonstrated above, on-
going joint ventures generally require transparency. This implies,
then, a unique requirement for partner firms in knowledge fo-
cused joint ventures. They must pay special attention to under-
standing the differences in goals and contexts held by each of the
2000]
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partner firms, and work to assure attention to both sets of needs.
Put somewhat abstractly, behavior can't be transparent unless
goals and contexts are public. Cooperative discussions to attain
understanding of diverse needs are difficult to obtain in perma-
nent relationships; they will be more challenging still in relation-
ships explicitly designed to be temporary.
The results of the tests of governance variables suggest
that shared governance increases the likelihood of termination.
This finding no doubt reflects the transaction costs of governance.
Sharing responsibility (and information and decision making and
the like) is expensive or exhausting. Perhaps both.
When combined with the results about transparency, the
shared governance findings present an interesting paradox. If
transparency helps forestall termination, and this is valued,
shared governance may be a path to transparency. Yet, shared
governance induces problems that have the same impact as the
lack of transparency, namely they increase the chance of termina-
tion, but for different reasons. Once again, the results illustrate
the importance of thinking thoroughly about potential long run
impacts of decisions made early in the venture.
One potential interpretation of these findings is that joint
ventures exhibit a form of inertia, and endure longer than they
should. The level of non-recoverable assets may impose inertia
based on a fear of loss, while the perception that behavior is
transparent may signal the presence of an enduring social bond
between the partners. This interpretation of the results suggests
the importance of recognizing the strategic value of a temporary
relationship early in the venture, and planning effective exit by
recognizing the inertial tendencies.
In summary, the analysis supports two important conclu-
sions. First, the factors that predict a venture will to continue in-
clude high levels of non-recoverable assets invested in the
venture, the presence of transparency in the partner, and the ab-
sence of shared governance. Second, the use of liquidation con-
tracts and extra-transactional relationships do not influence
termination rates.
This pattern of results implies that on-going understand-
ing of each partner's behavior and motives may be more impor-
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tant than ex ante attention protections in avoiding termination. In
turn, the ongoing understanding may not be possible without
explicit shared understanding of each firm's intentions as they
enter the venture. The more asymmetric the goals and contribu-
tions of against partner, the more difficult the task of obtaining
this understanding. Ventures with asymmetric goals and contri-
butions, though, may be the most interesting type in that these
conditions seem to offer opportunities for the creation of knowl-
edge. Finally, the pattern of results suggests that decisions about
ending the venture may require as much forethought as decisions
about starting the venture.
Put differently, the dance can't end well without starting
well. As with many social relationships, strong commitments that
recognize both similarities and difference assure endurance, and
endurance requires the acceptance of differences and the will to
adapt. Also, the dance can't end well unless it ends on time.
Unlike many social relationships, defining an ending point early




-- a N M 00
"tC U t > Ct-
C1 000N






C, l) . g g~ .2
co 0 v
0fl 0~ 0
CS 0 00 > - 0 x
Z Z. GomWc
*..:r C14 O\ en C0(O r- %0 C) C40
It- It - 00 C
,o 00 00 m (f n
CUO en 0) 00 'c




















304 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 4
